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COMMENTS
A SYMPOSIUM ON THE FAIR TRADE LAWS
F AIR trade laws are designed to enable the owner of a trade-mark
appearing on commodities of his manufacture to protect his good will
interest in that trade-mark by stipulating the price at which such com-
modities may be resold. The method employed is the resale price main-
tenance contract under which the vendee of trade-marked commodities
is contractually bound to sell such commodities at the stipulated price.
Although in certain circumstances these contracts were enforcible in
intrastate commerce at common law, the present basis for their enforce-
ment lies in the fair trade acts of the various states. While these statutes
permit the enforcement of resale price maintenance contracts in intrastate
commerce, the fact that such contracts violated the federal antitrust laws
necessitated the enactment of federal legislation to permit their enforce-
ment in interstate commerce. Such federal legislation came with the pass-
age of the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937 and the McGuire Act
of 1952. These statutes exempted resale price maintenance contracts,
where they were legal in the state of resale, from the ban of the antitrust
acts. Thus resale price maintenance contracts are effective today as a
matter of state law operating with congressional blessing. In such a situa-
tion the law is bound to vary from one jurisdiction to another.
The following articles represent an attempt to consider the field of fair
trade law from four major aspects: the constitutionality of fair trade
legislation; definitions and related problems; enforcement and procedure;
and indirect methods of evading the fair trade laws.
PART I: CONSTITUTIONALITY
STATUTORY HISTORY
In 1911, resale price maintenance contracts in so far as they were
operative in interstate commerce, were held to violate the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, because they eliminated competition at certain levels in the dis-
tribution of commodities and were therefore antithetical to the basic policy
of that statute.' After 1911, the courts continued to recognize the right
of a manufacturer to refuse to sell his products to one who would not
maintain satisfactory resale prices.2 But where a manufacturer employed
a system of placing serial numbers on merchandise, hiring salesmen to
report price cutters and urging dealers to do the same, keeping lists of
'undesirable price cutters," cutting of supplies to the "undesirables"-all
designed to make its "suggested" prices effective-the practice was held
1. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
2. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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to constitute an unfair method of competition. 3 Thus while the right to
refuse to sell was recognized it was a naked right and in the practical
sense it was impossible for the manufacturer to use it as a method of
controlling resale prices.
In 1931 the resale price maintenance agreement was legalized in Cal-
ifornia by the enactment of the first state fair trade law.4 Other states
followed suit until by 1936 forty-two states had enacted fair trade stat-
utes.' All were substantial equivalents of the California model, as amended
in 1933, and all purported to act only on intrastate commerce. The
typical fair trade statute permits a manufacturer of trade name or trade-
marked articles to control resale prices by contract and includes a pro-
vision whereby a nonsigner can be compelled to respect the prices estab-
lished by the fair trade contracts. The willful sale of fair traded articles
below the stipulated minimum resale prices is made tortious by the stat-
utes and such a seller is made subject to an action for damages and where
necessary injunctive relief will be granted against him.
The constitutionality of such a statute was first considered in Double-
day, Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co.' In that case the New York
Court of Appeals held the nonsigner provision of the statute unconstitu-
tional under both the federal and state constitutions. The court viewed
the statute as permitting arbitrary legislative price fixing of goods not "af-
fected with a public interest," and as open to the further criticism that it
entailed a delegation of legislative power to private persons. Later in
1936, appeals were taken to the United States Supreme Court from de-
cisions of the highest court of Illinois which had upheld its state fair trade
act.7 In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.8 the
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Illinois court and upheld the
constitutionality of fair tradeY On the authority of Old Dearborn New
York almost immediately overruled the Doubleday case. 10
Following the Old Dearborn 'decision Congress, in 1937, enacted
3. FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
4. Cal. Gen. Laws act 8782 (Deering 1931), as amended by Cal. Gen. Laws act 8782,
§ 1' (Deering 1933).
S. All states except Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas and Vermont had
fair trade statutes by 1936.
6. 269 N.Y. 272,199 N.E. 409 (1936).
7. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 I1. 610, 2 N.E.2d 940
(1936); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 11. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929 (1936).
8. 299 U.S. 183 (1936). The appeals from the California decisions were similarly decided
on the authority of the Old Dearborn case in The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S.
198 (1936).
9. Relying on its decision in the Old Dearborn case the Court, on the same day, upheld
the California fair trade act in The Pep Boys, Inc. v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
10. Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d 30 (1936).
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the Miller-Tydings Act" which permitted a limited exception to the
Sherman Act. The amendment was patterned on the original California
fair trade act, which contained no nonsigner clause. 2 It provided that
contracts or agreements, made by producers or distributors, prescribing
minimum prices for resale of brand name commodities in free and open
competition with other commodities of the same general class, produced
or distributed by others, shall be excepted from the general prohibition
of the Sherman Act. These contracts would thus be enforceable in inter-
state commerce where such contracts were lawful in the intrastate com-
merce of the state of resale.
THE McGunR ACT
The McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act 1
3
was enacted in 1952 to obviate two difficulties that were brought to light
through judicial interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Act. First, the
Supreme Court held in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,4
that the Miller-Tydings Act did not legalize the enforcement of the non-
signer provisions of state statutes in interstate commerce. Second, it
was held in Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling 5 that the enforcement of state
nonsigner provisions in interstate transactions would constitute an unlaw-
ful burden upon commerce.
The constitutionality of the McGuire Act has twice been upheld by
United States Courts of Appeal, but has yet to be considered by the Su-
preme Court. The Sixth Circuit Court in Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson16
cited United States v. McKesson & Robbins17 as "persuasive that the
Supreme Court views the McGuire Act as not invalid on constitutional
grounds," since in the latter case the statute had been before the Court
and no question of its constitutionality was raised. However, in that
case the Supreme Court merely interpreted the McGuire Act as not ex-
empting fair trade contracts, made by an integrated manufacturer with
wholesalers who were in competition with its own wholesale division,
from the prohibition of the federal antitrust laws. No constitutional issue
was involved. 18 The Fifth Circuit Court in Schwegmann Bros., Giant
Supermarket v. Eli Lilly & Co.,'9 rejected a contention that the act con-
11. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1953).
12. The nonsigner clause was added to the original California Fair Trade Act by amend-
ment in 1933. See note 4 supra.
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1957).
14. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
15. 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950).
16. 243 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1957).
17. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
18. Proposed legislation would effect a change in the result of this case. See H.R. 10527,
85th Cong., 2d Seas. § 2 (1958).
19. 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953).
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stituted an unconstitutional delegation of the commerce powers of Con-
gress to the states. This decision is in accord with the weight of author-
ity"0 if the underlying premise that the states have power to enact fair
trade laws be admitted as settled. It would therefore seem that a suc-
cessful attack on the McGuire Act would have to include a successful
attack on the rule of the Old Dearbori case.
In recent years a number of state courts have held fair trade a viola-
tion of the due process clauses of state constitutions2 ' reasoning that the
fair trade statutes have no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare and that they fix the price of commodities not
"affected with a public interest." These courts held that fair trade acts
are not for the benefit of the public, but for the special interests of certain
classes of manufacturers and retailers whose economic position is insured
by the destruction of competition on the retail level. That there is some
validity to these contentions cannot be denied, but it would seem that they
are more properly advanced to the legislatures than to the courts.
The "affected with a public interest" doctrine was reconsidered by the
Supreme Court even before it decided the Old Dearborn case. In Nebbia
v. New York,' the Court, in effect disregarding the "affected with a public
interest" test, said, "price control like any other form of regulation, is
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably ir-
relevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an un-
necessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty." 23 It
was this reasoning which the Court in Old Dearborn appears to have ap-
plied when it said, "the primary aim of the law is to protect the prop-
20. See United States v. Public Util. Comm'r, 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1953); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945) ; Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
21. The highest courts of the following states have held fair trade to be an unreasonable
denial of property in violation of state due process: Arkansas, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.
v. White River Distributers, Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Colorado, Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 Col. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1955); Florida, Miles
Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, - Fla. -, 73 So. 2d 680 (1954); Georgia, Cox v. General
Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 SXE.2d 514 (1955); Kansas,.Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. Du Pont, CCH
Trade Reg. Rep. (1958 Trade Cases) 1 68970 (Kan. Sup. Ct. 1958); Louisiana, Dr. G. H.
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarket, 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343
(1956); Michigan, Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich.
109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); Nebraska, McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159
Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); New Mexico, Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63
N.M. 215, 315 -P.2d 967 (1957); Ohio, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc.,
- Ohio -, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958); Oregon, General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Or. 302,
296 P.2d 635 (1956); South Carolina, Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., - S.C. -,
99 S.E.2d 665 (1957).
22. 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
23. Id. at 539.
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erty-namely, the good will of the producer, which he still owns. The
price restriction is adopted as an appropriate means to that perfectly
legitimate end, and not as an end in itself." 24
Some of the state courts, in invalidating local fair trade laws, resur-
rected the argument that fair trade is essentially a delegation of a legisla-
tive function (price fixing) to private individuals (the manufacturers
of trade-marked commodities). They would place reliance on the type of
reasoning put forth by the United States Supreme Court in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.25 This case questioned the constitutionality of the Bitumin-
ous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The act provided that a fifteen per cent
excise tax (admittedly a penalty) be imposed on unrefined coal, ninety per
cent of which would be returned to the producers if they filed an acceptance
of the Code that was set up by one provision of the act. Members of the
Code would be bound by the wages and hours agreements made by the
producers of two-thirds of the coal mined in the preceding year and the
representatives of half the mine workers. In declaring the statute un-
constitutional the Supreme Court said, "the power conferred upon the
majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling
minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form .. .
to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the in-
terests of the others in the same business . . . [I]n the very nature of
things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the
business of another, and especially of a competitor. And a statute which
attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitu-
tional interference with personal liberty and private property." 26
The Carter case, however, was severely limited by later cases27 and
it was expressly distinguished in Old Dearborn where the Court stated,
"we find nothing . . . to justify the contention that there is an un-
lawful delegation of power to private persons to control the disposition
of the property of others, such as was condemned in Eubank v. Rich-
mond, ... Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, . . . and Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.. .. In those cases the property had been acquired without any pre-
existing restriction in respect of its use or disposition .... Here, the re-
striction, already imposed with the knowledge of appellants, ran with the
acquisition and conditioned it." 28
Finally, whatever vitality may remain in the Carter case may well be
sapped by the fact that the statute gave private parties the power to fix
prices in businesses with which they had no contractual relationship and
24. 299 U.S. at 193.
25. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
26. Id. at 311.
27. See e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
28. 299 U.S. at 194.
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